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INSIDER THREAT RESPONSE AND RECOVERY STRATEGIES OF 
FINANCIAL SERVICES FIRMS 
Jacqueline Eggenschwiler, Ioannis Agrafiotis, and Jason R.C. Nurse 
Department of Computer Science, University of Oxford, UK  
  
Short abstract: This article analyses how financial services institutions address 
the threat from insiders, and in particular, how they respond to and recover 
from damaging insider-threat incidents. 
Long abstract: Insiders have become some of the most widely cited culprits of 
cybercrime. Over the past decade, the scale of attacks carried out by insiders has 
steadily increased. Financial services firms, in particular, have been frequent 
targets of insider attacks. While insider-threat awareness levels have grown 
over the years, threat management strategies remain to be better understood. 
This article analyses how financial services institutions address insider threat, 
and how they respond to, and recover from insider-threat incidents. It is argued 
that response and recovery strategies of financial services organisations are still 
nascent. Combining industry reports, academic literature, and semi-structured 
interviews with senior financial services security professionals, the research of-
fers a practice-oriented perspective on insider-threat response and recovery 
strategies, and identifies best practices. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Over the past decade, the number and scale of attacks carried out by insiders has 
seen a steady increase. 1 Financial services firms, in particular, have been fre-
quent targets of insider attacks. 2 
Historically, information security efforts of financial services firms have centred 
on defending external borders from intrusion by nefarious outsiders. More re-
cently however, security debates have broadened to include trusted employees, 
contractors, and business partners. 3 Financial services institutions have grown 
increasingly aware of the changing threat landscape and the debilitating effects 
of insider attacks on the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of financial 
data and systems. 4  
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While insider threat awareness levels have increased over the years, insider 
threat management practices remain to be better understood. Little is known 
about the spectrum of measures taken by financial services firms in response to 
insider attacks. In an attempt to acquire a better and more comprehensive un-
derstanding of insider threat response and recovery practices, the article seeks 
to address the following questions: How do financial services firms tackle insid-
er threat? How do they respond to insider threat incidents? And what means of 
recovery do they employ?  
For the purpose of this article, insiders are defined as current or former employ-
ees, contractors, or business partners who have or had authorised access to an 
organisatiǯǡǡǡ
intentionally or unintentionally, in a manner that adversely affected the confi-
dentiality, integrity, or avaiǯnetwork, system, or data. 
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Combining industry reports, academic literature, and semi-structured inter-
views with senior financial services security professionals, this article moves 
away from a purely theoretical investigation, and pays due regard to the practi-
cal realities of insider threat management. 
The remainder of this article is organised along four sections. The first section 
reviews relevant background literature on insider threat management. The sec-
ond section provides a short industry overview and outlines the research aim 
and methodology of the article. The third section presents and discusses the 
findings obtained from industry reports, semi-structured expert interviews, and 
secondary literature research, and highlights best practices. The fourth section 
summarises the results. 
RELATED WORK 
Insider threat has advanced to an issue of growing concern and significance, a 
fact also reflected in the soaring number of publications dedicated to the topic. 6 
Contributions cover a wider range of different themes spanning from behav-
ioural research to technical attack modelling. 7Ȃ10 
Insider threat management denotes an emerging focus area of operational risk 
and information security management. It is concerned with addressing the secu-
rity threats posed to organisations by trusted individuals who have intricate 
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knowledge of internal operations and processes, and/or access to sensitive sys-
tems and data. 11 The key building blocks of effective insider threat management 
mirror those expressed in the NIST Framework for Improving Critical Infra-
structure Cybersecurity, and include: identify, protect, detect, respond, and re-
cover. 12 
The framework allows organisations to individually assess threats most relevant 
to their  ǲand to develop a risk-based approach to resource alloca-ǳ. 13 It enables organisations to express their insider threat management ef-
forts in terms of critical assets (identify), implemented controls and safeguards 
(protect), manifested threats (detect), formulated incident response strategies 
(respond), and business continuity plans (recover). 
Much of the research on insider threat management has focused on pre-emptive 
protection and detection strategies. Sasaki, for example, promotes a detection 
framework based on psychological triggers that impels insiders to behave suspi-
ciously. 14 Legg et al advocate a tiered insider threat detection model that incor-
porates elements from enterprise, people, technology, information, and physical 
domains. 15 Nurse et al introduced a framework for characterising, and later, de-
tecting insider attacks, based on technical, psychological and behavioural fac-
tors. 16 And Hashem et al advance an insider threat monitoring and detection 
framework based on human bio-signals (electroencephalography and electro-
cardiogram signals). 17 
In contrast, response and recovery tactics have received less scholarly attention. 
However, the continuous surge in the number of insider threat incidents war-
rants closer examination of organisational response and recovery strategies. 18Ȃ
20 Neither protection nor detection schemes offer absolute security. Trusted in-
siders often have intimate knowledge about the controls and detection mecha-
nisms in place and are able to side-step existing physical and electronic security 
measures by legitimate means. No single prevention or detection framework can 
guarantee total security, which is why adequate response and recovery strate-
gies are all the more important. Trzeciak ǣǲIt is essential that organisations O?ǥO?take the necessary steps to ensure organisational resilience by implementing 
and regularly testinO?O?ǳǤ 21 
According to research conducted by the National Cybersecurity Institute, inci-
dent response is a complex undertaking, involving a wide range of organisation-
al departments. Insider threat incidents are motivated by a combination of tech-
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nical, behavioural, and organisational factors. As a result, effective management 
requires a disciplined, risk-based, cross-functional, approach that includes cor-
porate security, Information Technology (IT), information security, legal, Human 
Resources (HR), audit, and other relevant control functions.  
Insider threat response and recovery strategies are of critical importance to an ǯ   Ǥ They are key constituents of successful 
insider threat management, and worthy of more comprehensive analysis.  
CONTEXT, RESEARCH AIM AND METHODOLOGY 
The main objective of this article is to examine the insider threat response and 
recovery practices of financial services firms. The research questions at the cen-
tre of interest are: 
- How do financial services firms tackle insider threat?  
- How do they respond to insider threat incidents?  
- And what means of recovery do they employ? 
Financial services firms are organisations that conduct financial transactions 
such as investments, loans or deposits, and devise and sell financial products. 
There exist various types of financial services firms, including banks, insurance 
companies, asset management boutiques, credit card companies, consumer fi-
nance enterprises, stock brokerages, investment funds, and government spon-
sored entities. 22 
As custodians of highly sensitive data and valuable physical assets, financial ser-
vices institutions represent prime targets of information attack. According to 
research conducted by Websense Security Labs, financial services firms are un-
der constant barrage by cybercriminalsǤ ǲ ǡ nancial services busi-
nesses are attacked 300 percent more than other O?O?ǳǤ 23 Attacks car-
ried out by internal miscreants rank among the most pressing information secu-
rity challenges of financial services firms. Cases such as Morgan Stanley, under-
line the severity of insider threat for financial services firms.  
In order to acquire a better and more comprehensive understanding of the in-
sider threat response and recovery strategies of financial services firms, the arti-
cle employs qualitative means of data collection and analysis. Qualitative meth-
ods subsume a broad collection of naturalistic, interpretative approaches, fo-
cused on exploring phenomena from the inside. Qualitative methods describe a 
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ǲǡrial practices that make the world visible. These prac-
tices transform the world. They turn the world into a series of representations, 
including field notes, interviews, conversations O?ǤǤǤO?ǳǤ 24 They are particularly 
suitable for scholarly ventures aiming to obtain a better understanding and 
sense of real world complexities and intricate social phenomena.  
Methodologically, the article draws on a number of different sources, including 
secondary academic literature on insider threat management, primary materials 
on industry developments, as well as semi-structured interviews with senior 
financial services security professionals.  
A total of five semi-structured interviews were conducted with senior financial 
services security professionals. Interviews were given some structure using an 
interview guide. Research participants were selected on the basis of their expo-
sure to the financial services industry as well as their expertise in the area of in-
formation security management. Participants were primarily recruited via email 
and social media (LinkedIn) and came from backgrounds including banking, as-
set management, and consumer credit. The majority of interviewees benefited 
from international experience and global exposure. For reasons of confidentiali-
ty, names and corporate affiliations will not be disclosed. Relevant opinions 
voiced by the interviewees will be referenced indirectly.  
In addition to semi-structured interviews, data was collected by means of online 
desk research. Databases queried included, among others, IEEE Xplore, EBSCO-
host, ACM Digital Library, Google Scholar, Google Books, as well as Search Oxford 
Libraries Online (SOLO). The key search terms encompassed insider threat 
management practices, insider threat response and recovery strategies of finan-
cial services firms, incident response measures of financial services firms, as 
well as insider threat management cycle.  
Patterns/themes within the data collected were identified, analysed, and report-
ed with help of thematic analysis. Thematic analysis is a research technique that ǲes and describes O?O?ǳǤ 25 
FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION 
This section reports and discusses the theoretical and empirical results of the 
study. The findings are organised along the research questions outlined earlier. 
How do financial services firms tackle insider threat?  
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Incidents of fraud, theft, and abuse, emanating from internal miscreants, present 
financial services firms with serious challenges. Launched with intricate ǡǲty 
to create sizable risks in relation to digital assets and are also the most challeng-ǳǤ 26 
Empirical evidence confirms the prevalence of insider threat across financial 
services enterprises. With the exception of one interviewee, participants con-
firmed that their respective organisations have been subject to insider attacks. 
In line with industry accounts, participants reported that the majority of insider 
attacks are based on financial motivations and frequently involve data theft. 
Other motives exist, eg revenge, disgruntlement, or corporate espionage, but are 
less prevalent.  
Participants mentioned that security breaches emanate from all types of roles 
and responsibilities. They further stated that the handling of insider incidents is 
highly complex and challenging. Effective insider threat management usually 
involves a great number of different stakeholders, and is often done behind 
closed doors so as to avoid negative publicity and reputational damage.  
The fact that the majority of insider threat cases are dealt with internally and go 
unreported, limits the positive effects of data sharing and leaves industry part-ǲvulnerable to risks because those that hire these individuals in the future 
have no way to assess their threat potentialǳǤ 27  
Rather than constituting a separate policy domain, respondents confirmed that 
insider threat is generally addressed in the context of wider risk management. 
With the exception of one financial services organisation, none of the firms sur-
veyed had stand-alone insider threat handling policies in place. Given the severi-
ty of the risk, however, dedicated insider threat policies would help embed the 
issue more firmly and permanently. Policy commitment and adherence are abso-
lutely critical for addressing insider breaches in a systematic and robust manner. 
Respondents highlighted that effective mitigation and containment of insider 
attacks require the presence of tried and tested incident response plans. These 
plans have to come into effect immediately after detection, and follow clear exe-
cution guidelines. Pre-incident simulation exercises as well as senior manage-
ment buy-in are vital for successful execution. Senior management support is 
important for two reasons: 	ǡǲstand the 
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negative effects of malicious insiders and support corrective actions, [for anoth-
er, employees know] that senior leadership fully [back] insider threat efforts and 
a prompt ǳǤ28 
Effective, expeditious, and judicious execution of incident response plans is par-
ticularly challenging across matrix organisations, where responsibilities overlap 
at times and accountabilities are not always well-defined.  
Misalignment between key response functions can negatively affect organisa-
tions, both financially and organisationally. Consequently, clear, policy-driven 
governance structures are essential for successful insider threat management.  ǲ ǦǡǡǡǡO?ǥO?ǡǦ
ter intelligence resources. Incident response plans commonly revolve around 
the following core activities: 
- Initial incident assessment (following detection) 
- Cross-functional communication of attack 
- Damage control and risk minimisation 
- Detailed severity assessment 
- Forensic analysis and evidence protection 
- Notification of third parties where applicable ǲ     Ǥ O?ǡ    
each other or throughout the incident]. For example, documentation [should] 
start at the very beginning and continue throughout the entire life cycle of the ǢǡǡO?O?ǳǤ 
The majority of respondents corroborated that incident response activities de-
mand a high degree of departmental collaboration and that their respective or-
ganisations employ cross-functional computer security incident response teams 
to address insider attacks. Insider threat management has to be regarded as a 
critical organisational function that develops over time, not as a temporally lim-
ited project. 29 As a result, it requires continuous participation and commitment      Ǥ ǲIt also [demands] participation from ap-
propriate lines of business, as well as finely tuned data privacy policieǳǤ  
How do financial services firms respond to insider threat incidents? 
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Insider threat response measures can take many different forms, but can broad-
ly be divided into two categories: internal and external measures.  
External insider threat response measures denote a collection of response activi-
ties that are conducted in cooperation with company-external third parties, eg 
law enforcement agencies. In contrast, internal insider threat response 
measures describe a set of enterprise-specific remediation options that are exe-
cuted without the involvement of third parties. Re-training efforts and organisa-
tional sanctions are but two examples of internal incident response measures. 
Depending on the motivation, severity, and scale of insider attacks, internal re-
sponse measures are preferred over external ones. According to the senior fi-
nancial services security professionals interviewed, insider incidents are only 
reported to external bodies, eg national reporting entities, CERTs, or law en-
forcement agencies, in case of egregious breaches, ie where intent, severity, and 
scale warrant civil or criminal prosecution.  
Considering recent regulatory developments, this kind of reporting behaviour 
might (need to) change in the near future. On 6 July 2016, the European Parlia-
ment and the Council adopted a directive that requires operators of essential ǡ    ǡ  ǲ    
competent authority or the [national] Computer Security Incident Response 
Team (CSIRT) of incidents having a significant impact on the continuity of essen-
tial services  ǳǤ 30 The Directive on security of network and infor-
mation systems (NIS Directive) has yet to be implemented but could potentially 
have far-reaching effects on the incident reporting behaviour of financial ser-
vices firms, requiring them to report more frequently and more transparently. 
When carrying out legal actions, financial services firms are well-advised to co-
ordinate response procedures with relevant other departments, especially Gen-
eral Counsel, and consider privacy and civil liberties at all times. 31 
Legal prosecution requires the production of clear and convincing evidence, eg 
by use of forensic analysis. The burden of proof lies with the attacked financial 
services organisation.  
According to the experts interviewed, many financial services firms abstain from 
involving law enforcement agencies or legal charges because doing so: 
- Involves a great amount of red tape (high administrative burden and 
agency cost) and creates a public record; 
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- Can cause irreparable reputational damage (loss of brand image); 
-  ǯ competitive position 
(loss of market share); 
- Increases liability exposure. 
Although, from a corporate/strategic perspective, a certain level of reluctance to 
involve third parties might be justifiable, engaging with law enforcement agen-
cies can yield certain benefits. First of all, it can help recover damages and pro-
tect (intellectual) property, and second of all, it can help prevent other organisa-
tions from hiring charged internal miscreants in the future. 
Financial services firms should consider the full spectrum of disciplinary op-
tions, including legal measures, when responding to insider threat incidents. 
Merely dismissing insiders defers a potentially dangerous problem to another 
unsuspecting enterprise. 32 At the same time, pursuing an approach that is too 
heavy-handed can create pitfalls for financial services firms where none used to 
exist. It can, for example, lead to indiscreet inquiries, unsubstantiated allega-
tions, and accusations that negatively affect employee morale and corporate cul-
ture. ǲ-controlling systems are unable to per-
form. Too light a touch sees key assets and resources too easy to misuse, alter, or 
stealǳǤ 
Financial services firms have to strike a fine balance between lightweight disci-
plinary measures and punitive sanctions, and between protection, control, and 
value creation, respectively. 
What means of recovery do financial services firms employ?  
Successful insider threat management involves incident recovery, ie restoration 
of the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of affected systems and data. 33 
Incident recovery is as complex as incident response and involves the following 
core activities: 
- Recovery of systems and data 
- Compilation and organisation of incident documentation 
- Assessment of incident damage and cost 
- Review of response measures and issuance of policy updates where ap-
plicable 
- Roll-out of staff trainings and education 
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In line with secondary research, respondents confirmed that incident review and 
integration of response learnings are key success factors for effective recovery. 
34 Insider threat recovery requires the cooperation of an entire organisation, not 
just the technical departments and security functions. Reducing follow-up activi-
ties to IT and security departments runs the risk of excluding other corporate 
functions that also play a crucial role in incident recovery, and inhibits organisa-
tional learning.  
Lessons learned have to be incorporated into company-wide incident response 
plans, and have to be communicated to wider staff accordingly. This allows em-
ployees to get acquainted with organisational insider threat response measures 
and helps them understand that insider threat incidents are taken seriously. 
On the topic of communication, senior financial services security professionals 
stated that informal communication and exchange of threat intelligence among 
peers is invaluable for successful recovery. The question arises, whether collab-
oration would yield even more benefits if it were institutionalised more formal-
ly. More institutionalised communication and exchange of security intelligence 
would, for example, aid the dissemination of industry best practices for insider 
threat response and recovery. 
According to the experts interviewed, educational measures, such as employee 
trainings or awareness campaigns, also play a vital role for successful insider 
threat recovery. Financial services firms have addressed the need for education-
al measures with a number of different training instruments, including compul-
sory in-person training sessions, web-based online class-rooms, as well as video-
based information campaigns.  
While the existence of relevant training instruments is essential, they do not 
represent a carte blanche for effective recovery. Training instruments have to be 
assessed for their effectiveness on a regular basis, and educational measures ad-
justed and updated where necessary. Financial services firms must ensure that 
their employees are presented with relevant, up-to-date, and engaging learning 
content. Relevant employee education is a key contributor to enhanced organi-
sational resilience, and indispensable for effective insider threat management. 
Meaningful and enduring recovery cannot be achieved effectively without the 
buy-in of senior management. Among other things, top-down support helps im-
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     ǲ    ǳǤ 
In order to further strengthen and mature their insider threat response and re-
covery strategies, financial services firms should consider the following best 
practices:  
- Establish clear insider threat management governance structures 
- Devise, implement, follow, and periodically review dedicated insider 
threat management policies 
- Coordinate, memorise, and streamline response and recovery measures 
and consider employing relevant third parties, eg law enforcement agen-
cies, more frequently 
- Ensure transparent communication of response and recovery measures 
to relevant stakeholders and create a sense of ownership among them  
- Formalise threat intelligence sharing activities and leverage key learn-
ings across organisations 
- Provide staff with relevant insider threat education and development 
programmes, and ensure regular reviews of programme effectiveness  
- Evaluate response and recovery practices and include lessons learned in-
to future activities 
- Ensure senior management buy-in and award the right level of attention 
to insider threat management 
CONCLUSION 
Financial services firms represent some of the most highly regulated and pro-
tected entities of the private sector. At the same time, they represent perennially 
attractive targets for cyberattacks. According to primary as well as secondary 
research, financial services firms are under more scrutiny than ever for the se-
curity of their critical assets (tangible and intangible). Rogue insiders in particu-
lar, present these enterprises with serious challenges. Although financial ser-
vices organisations have grown increasingly aware of the shifting threat land-
scape and the debilitating effects of insider attacks on the confidentiality, integri-
ty, and availability of financial data and systems, insider threat response and re-
covery strategies are still nascent.  
Results obtained from industry reports, academic literature, and semi-
structured interviews suggest that effective, organisationally-entrenched, insid-
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er threat management practices continue to be a work in progress for many fi-
nancial services firms. Comprehensive insider threat management policies are 
largely absent, and incident response measures often too light-touch, leaving 
financial services firms, their data, and systems exposed and vulnerable.  
While insider threat management programs cannot not guarantee absolute pro-
tection, well thought-out response and recovery strategies can equip financial 
services firms with the necessary means to counter internal risks more effective-
ly and rehabilitate from incidents more quickly, capabilities that contribute to 
enhanced organisational resilience. 
Given the prevalence and potentially far-reaching consequences of insider threat 
incidents, financial services firms need to recognise insider threat management 
as an obligation that can no longer be ignored, and a function that requires cor-
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